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Sell-Side Analysts’ Benchmarks 
 
ABSTRACT 
Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their recommendations. A 
buy for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its industry, while for other 
brokers it means the stock is expected to outperform the market, or some return threshold. We 
show that these stated benchmarks have implications for the distribution of recommendations, 
price reactions to recommendations, and the investment value of recommendations. We conclude 
that, depending on the question, academics may need to account for the benchmarks when studying 
analysts’ outputs, and investors may find the benchmarks beneficial in interpreting analysts’ 
advice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A voluminous literature examines sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations: how they are 
created, how they relate to other analysts’ outputs, and whether they are useful to investors. 
However, the literal meaning of recommendations (buy, hold or sell), and its relation to the actual 
investment advice (to buy, hold, or sell a stock), have largely been implicitly assumed uniform 
across different brokers and analysts. Such an assumption may be an oversimplification. 
Inspections of the disclosures in which brokers describe the meaning of their recommendations 
reveal that different brokers assign different meanings to their recommendations and refer to 
different benchmarks when issuing them. For example, a buy at one broker means the stock is 
expected to outperform its industry peers (we call such a broker an “industry benchmarker”); at 
another a buy means the stock is expected to outperform the market (“market benchmarker”); and 
at yet another, a buy means that the stock is expected to earn a return above some pre-determined 
threshold such as ten percent (“total benchmarker”).  
The different literal meanings suggested by these benchmarks may carry implications on 
how the recommendations should be interpreted. For example, at face value, a buy 
recommendation from an industry benchmarker is a direct and clear signal of the within-industry 
prospects of the firm, as opposed to a buy recommendation from a market benchmarker, which 
carries with it information on both the firm and its industry. As a result, recommendations from 
industry benchmarkers may be better predictors of a firm’s industry-adjusted returns. From an 
investment perspective, the ability to discern winners and losers in an industry from a set of 
recommendations may depend on the benchmark adopted by the broker. Thus, ignoring the 
benchmarks may hinder the ability to fully capture the information conveyed by recommendations. 
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to examine empirically whether the various benchmarks 
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used by different brokerage houses have implications for the information provided by analysts’ 
stock recommendations. Specifically, we study the impact of different benchmarks on the 
distribution of recommendations, price reactions to recommendations, and the investment value of 
recommendations.  
Large-scale data on the benchmarks has not been readily available. Before 2002, brokers 
were not required to disclose the detailed meaning of their recommendations. While nowadays a 
recommendation report must document the meaning of the recommendation advice, aggregators 
and disseminators of recommendation data (Dow Jones Newswires, Bloomberg, Finance Yahoo, 
etc.) still ignore such fine print.1 For academics, the usual databases they rely upon (IBES and 
FirstCall) do not carry detailed information about the literal meaning of recommendations.  
It can be argued that the benchmarks should be ignored if they do not affect the way 
recommendations are generated. This would be the case if benchmarks are irrelevant, non-binding, 
statements that in reality do not drive the way analysts work and have no implications for the way 
investors should interpret the recommendations. It is ultimately an empirical question whether and 
how the benchmarks are relevant for interpreting recommendations, and how they interact with 
other analysts’ outputs.  
Beginning in September of 2002, and following Rule NASD 2711, Rule NYSE 472, and 
the Global Settlement, which attempted to mitigate conflicts of interests in analysts’ research, 
brokers are required to define in each report the literal meaning of their recommendations. This 
definition must include the benchmark used when interpreting the recommendation advice. To 
examine our research questions we hand-collect the meaning of recommendations for 195 brokers 
accounting for over 95 percent of all recommendations issued during our sample period 
                                                             
1 An exception is the investment website MarketWatch (http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/guide.asp), which 
provides its readers with a detailed guide, including benchmarks, for properly interpreting recommendations issued 
by different brokers.  
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(September 2002-December 2014). We find that the most prevalent benchmarks adopted by 
brokers are the industry (accounting for 24 percent of the recommendations), market (15 percent 
of recommendations), and total benchmarks (20 percent of the recommendations).  Other brokers 
typically use either combinations or risk-adjusted versions of these three benchmarks. Given their 
popularity and the simplicity of their meaning, we focus our empirical analysis on brokers 
employing these three benchmarks exclusively. 
In our first analysis we test whether the distribution of stock recommendations issued by 
analysts is related to the benchmarks adopted by their brokerage house. We find that an analyst’s 
tendency to issue more bullish recommendations is strongly associated with the benchmark. 
Specifically, the distribution of recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers is less bullish 
as compared to the distribution of recommendations issued by market and total benchmarkers. 
These patterns do not necessarily imply an inherent difference in optimism across analysts 
employing different benchmarks—given that each benchmark carries a different meaning for the 
recommendation advice. Nevertheless, they suggest that, when studying the optimism of analysts 
through their recommendations, one should account for the heterogeneity of the recommendation 
distribution by controlling for the benchmark type. 
In our next analysis, we explore price reactions to recommendations. In our setup it is 
important to distinguish among different types of price changes as they relate to the benchmarks. 
When considering recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers it is natural to study 
industry-adjusted returns. Similarly, when considering recommendations issued by market (total) 
benchmarkers it is natural to study market-adjusted (unadjusted) returns. Following this approach 
we find that industry-adjusted price reactions to recommendations are more prominent for 
recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers compared to recommendation issued by 
market and total benchmarkers. By contrast, we do not find evidence that recommendations issued 
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by market benchmarkers garner significantly different market-adjusted price reactions. 
Interestingly, unadjusted price reactions are significantly smaller in magnitude for 
recommendations issued by total benchmarkers.  
These results are consistent with the flavor of the complexity argument introduced by 
Clement (1999). Clement argues that analysts facing more complex tasks issue less accurate 
forecasts. In similar vein, complexity may impair the quality of a recommendation signal, and thus 
investors should react most strongly to recommendations issued by analysts dealing with the least 
complex task. In the context of recommendations, total benchmarkers face the most challenging 
task, as they are required to provide insights on the expected performance of a given stock, its 
industry, and the market as a whole (as these are all embedded in the estimation of raw returns). 
Market and industry benchmarkers face less complex tasks as they are only required to provide 
insights on expected returns of a given industry and/or a given stock relative to its industry.   
Each benchmark is associated with a specific objective for a recommendation. Industry 
benchmarkers’ buy recommendations are aiming at beating industry peers; for market 
benchmarkers the objective is beating the market; and the objective of total benchmarkers is to 
beat an absolute return threshold. To evaluate analysts’ ability to achieve their stated objectives 
and whether achieving the objectives varies by benchmark, we collect for each broker the target 
return associated with its benchmark. For example, a target return for a buy recommendation 
issued by an industry (market) benchmarker specifies by how much the recommended firm is 
expected to beat the industry (market). Similarly, a target return for a buy recommendation issued 
by a total benchmarker specifies an absolute return such as ten percent.2 We then examine whether 
and by how much the return of a recommended firm meets or beats its stated objective.  
                                                             
2 The stated objective of a recommendation thus includes both a benchmark category (whether the firm’s stock is 
expected to beat industry peers, the market, or an absolute return) and a benchmark target (how much the 
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Not surprisingly, we find that industry and market benchmarkers are more successful in 
meeting their objectives compared to total benchmarkers. For example, about 51 percent of buy 
recommendations issued by industry or market benchmarkers meet or beat their objective, 
compared to 44 percent of buy recommendations issued by total benchmarkers. These results 
reflect the fact that meeting the objective for total benchmarkers is a relatively more difficult task. 
Indeed, total benchmarkers are expected to predict firm-specific returns, industry returns, and 
market returns, and they tend to adopt the most stringent target thresholds. 
When comparing a recommendation return with its stated objective, we are evaluating the 
analyst performance based on the literal meaning of her recommendation advice. But performance 
of a recommendation may simply derive from the risk profile of the recommended stock. To 
account for such risk, we use a propensity score methodology matching each actual 
recommendation to a control unit (some other firm at another point in time) with a similar risk 
profile. We find that for all types of benchmarks, firms for which analysts issue buy (sell) 
recommendations perform better (worse) than firms with similar risk characteristics that did not 
receive such recommendations. Thus, our results show that, regardless of the benchmarks, analysts 
perform better than a “naïve” strategy that simply picks stocks based on their risk characteristics.  
In our final analysis we study how the different benchmarks affect the value of analysts’ 
advice in identifying winners and losers within a particular industry (stock picking). The 
benchmarks can either help or hinder the stock picking ability of analysts. Indeed, the complexity 
hypothesis (discussed above) suggests that the stock-picking skills of market and total 
benchmarkers would be hindered as compared to industry benchmarkers. Furthermore, the 
benchmarks can affect the ability of analysts to convey their stock-picking opinion through their 
                                                             
recommended firm is expected to surpass its benchmark category). Throughout the paper, we employ the word 
benchmark to refer to a benchmark category rather than a benchmark target.   
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recommendations. Industry benchmarkers assert to rely on stock picking alone, so their buys and 
sells are expected to be direct signals of winners and losers within an industry. By contrast, 
recommendations issued by market and total benchmarkers do not provide as clear a signal on 
within-industry winners and losers. For example, a good stock in a very poor industry may be a 
buy for an industry benchmarker, but a hold or even a sell for a market or total benchmarker. Thus, 
once again, recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers are expected to provide a superior 
signal for picking stocks within an industry. 
To test this hypothesis we use the methodology introduced in Boni and Womack (2006), 
which forms industry- and market-neutral portfolios such that the only source of abnormal 
performance is within-industry stock picking. We then calculate the Fama-French four-factor 
alphas of these portfolios separately for each benchmark. We find that recommendations issued by 
industry benchmarkers generate a statistically significant and economically large (0.44 percent per 
month) alpha associated with the stock picking information contained in their recommendations. 
By contrast, we find no significant alpha for either market or total benchmarkers. This indicates 
that the more elaborate definitions associated with the latter’s benchmarks hinder their ability to 
provide useful stock picking information to investors. 
This paper is the first to focus exclusively on sell-side benchmarks, for which we provide 
the first large-scale and comprehensive analysis. Our analysis is consistent with Bradshaw’s (2012) 
assessment that these benchmarks are important for the study of sell-side research. We contribute 
to the literature by documenting how these benchmarks are related to the distribution of analysts’ 
recommendations, studying how they affect different outputs of analysts, and investigating their 
relation to the investment value of stock recommendations. Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach 
(2012) provide some preliminary discussion of the sell-side benchmarks, within their study of 
industry recommendations. They point out  the existence of the benchmarks and use a small sample 
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of disclosures from 20 brokers to study the relation between firm and industry recommendations. 
Thus, the scale and focus of these two papers are different.  
 
II. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS  
Data 
We focus on analysts’ stock recommendations and other types of outputs of all U.S. firms 
in the period of September 2002 to December 2014.  The source for analysts’ data is the IBES 
database.  The data on firm characteristics are from COMPUSTAT.  We obtain stock returns from 
CRSP, and equity offerings data from SDC. Industry membership is inferred through the industry 
classification defined by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. The GICS system is widely adopted by financial practitioners as an industry 
classification system, and has been increasingly used in academic studies (e.g., Bhojraj, Lee, and 
Oler 2003, Boni and Womack 2006; and Kadan et al. 2012). Following Kadan, Madureira, Wang, 
and Zach (2009), we remove the recommendations issued during the events of rating changes in 
2002, as these are merely technical. 
We manually collect data on the benchmarks used by brokers that issued at least 200 
recommendations during our sample period. There are 374,807 recommendations issued by all 
brokers during our sample period for U.S. firms, out of which 355,317 are issued by brokers with 
at least 200 recommendations. The threshold of 200 recommendations enables us to collect 
benchmark data of large brokers without a significant loss of recommendation data.   
Under NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 adopted in mid-2002, brokers are required 
to disclose the literal meaning of their recommendations inside their reports. We collect these 
disclosures from three sources.  First, we retrieve information from full-text research reports in the 
Investext database when available.  Second, for brokerage houses not appearing in Investext, we 
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collect data from the Investars website,3 which contains the ratings’ definitions of some brokers.  
Finally, if necessary, we obtain data directly from brokers’ websites.  
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Based on the disclosures, we categorize brokers into ten different types according to the 
benchmarks they use. Table 1 describes these benchmarks and provides general summary 
statistics. The three most basic benchmarks involve determining recommendations according to 
the expected performance of the covered stock compared to the performance of industry peers, the 
market, or some fixed return threshold. More formally, we classify brokers as industry 
benchmarkers if they state that their stock recommendations are benchmarked against industry 
performance.  For example, Smith Barney’s analysts rate stocks based on the “stock’s performance 
vs. the analyst's industry coverage for the coming 12-18 months.” We classify brokers as market 
benchmarkers if they state that their stock recommendations are benchmarked against market 
performance.  For example, Wachovia’s analysts rate a stock based on its expected performance 
“relative to the market over the next 12 months.” Finally, we classify brokers as total benchmarkers 
if they issue recommendations based on a stock’s expected total return.  This is the case, for 
example, with Deutsche Bank, where a buy recommendation means that the stock’s price is 
“expected to appreciate ten percent or more over a 12-month period.”  
Occasionally brokers determine their recommendations using some combination of these 
three basic benchmarks. We identify four such combinations. For example, Dougherty & Co 
combines features of market and industry benchmarks, so that its buy means a stock is “expected 
to outperform the broader market and/or its sector.” We categorize this broker as a market/industry 
benchmarker. Other hybrids we identify are market/total, industry/total, and market/industry/total. 
                                                             
3 http://www.investars.com 
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Other brokers refine the basic benchmarks by adding a risk-adjustment feature. For 
example, Morgan Stanley establishes its recommendations based on the “stock’s total return vs. 
analyst’s coverage on a risk-adjusted basis.” Notably, the nature of the adjustment for risk is often 
vague. To highlight this feature, we add a new category and classify Morgan Stanley as an 
industry/risk benchmarker. Similarly, we classify a broker as market/risk (total/risk) when the 
benchmark involves comparing the stock’s expected performance to the market (a total return 
threshold) on some type of risk-adjusted measure.  
Some brokers changed their benchmarks during our sample period. For example, Merrill 
Lynch used a total/risk benchmark between September 2002 and May 2008, and an industry/total 
benchmark since June 2008. In this case, we classify Merrill Lynch as a total/risk benchmarker 
between September 2002 and May 2008, and as an industry/total benchmarker between June 2008 
and December 2014. However, for some brokers, we failed to identify the exact date of the change.  
We classify such instances as a “Changes” category. Finally, some brokers could not be classified 
in any of the above categories, either because we could not find any data on their analysts’ 
disclosures or because their disclosures did not fall into any of the above categories. 
Table 1 reports that 38 brokers use the industry benchmark during our sample period, and 
the number of recommendations issued by such brokers accounts for about 24.1 percent of all 
recommendations. There are 52 brokers that base their recommendations on a total benchmark, 
and as a group they issued about 19.8 percent of all recommendations. The number of brokers 
relying on a market benchmark is 29, accounting for 14.8 percent of all recommendations.4 
                                                             
4 For each broker, if available, we download research reports every year to check the consistency of the ratings 
definition during the sample period. If there is a change in ratings definition, we download more reports to identify 
the date of change. For some brokers, reports are only available in some of the years, and we then extrapolate the 
definition to the rest of the sample period. Similarly, when we collect ratings definitions from Investars or the broker’ 
website, we assume that the broker uses the same ratings definition for the entire sample period. Overall, during the 
sample period there are 195 brokers with at least 200 recommendations, of which 20 change their benchmarks once, 
and one broker changed its benchmark twice. Therefore, the total number of brokers in Table 1 is 217. 
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Brokers using risk-adjusted benchmarks are usually large, as revealed by the average 
number of recommendations issued in each category (Morgan Stanley is one such case), but there 
are relatively few of them. Therefore, as a group they account for just under 16 percent of 
recommendations. Similarly, there are few brokers combining the basic benchmarks. Finally, we 
fail to collect data on benchmarks for 39 brokers, but these brokers are relatively small (with an 
average of 566 recommendations during the sample period), and as a group they issued about 6.2 
percent of recommendations in our sample.   
In this paper we focus our attention on the three basic benchmarks. Two reasons drive our 
choice. First, we want to address a set of benchmarks that is representative of the universe of 
brokers. Industry, market, and total benchmarkers thoroughly satisfy this requirement: Together 
they account for about 59 percent of the recommendations in our sample period, and they are 
adopted by 12 of the 20 largest brokers.  Second, we need to address benchmarks that have a 
straightforward interpretation, so that clear testable hypotheses can be developed. This requirement 
again favors the three basic benchmarks, as they are the most precisely defined, particularly when 
compared to the risk-adjusted benchmarks (brokers adopting these risk-adjusted benchmarks do 
not properly document the meaning of their risk-adjustment feature) or to the benchmarks that 
combine more than one basic benchmark.5 Therefore, the sample used in this paper, encompassing 
data from industry, market and total benchmarkers, includes 208,674 recommendations (59 
percent of the overall sample).  
< Insert Table 2 here > 
Besides the benchmark, the recommendation’s stated objective (or, its literal meaning) 
carries a target threshold as well. For example, in the case of a buy, a broker may adopt a target 
                                                             
5 In unreported results, we conducted all the relevant analyses in the paper including separate categories for industry, 
market and total benchmarkers who adjust for risk. None of our conclusions is affected by this inclusion while the 
results for the risk-adjusted categories are mixed and inconclusive. This is perhaps due to the lack of specifics 
regarding the nature of the risk-adjustments used by brokers.  
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threshold of ten percent, such that the literal meaning of the recommendation is that the stock is 
expected to surpass the benchmark return by ten percent.6 Table 2 presents summary statistics of 
the target thresholds used by brokers in our sample. Panel A shows the thresholds used by industry 
benchmarkers. The most frequent target is zero, saying that a typical buy (sell) recommendation 
issued by an industry benchmarker means that the recommended stock’s return will exceed (be 
lower than) the industry return over the forecast horizon. Panel B shows that for market 
benchmarkers the most common threshold is also zero, corresponding to the expectation that the 
stock’s return of a buy (sell) recommendation exceeds (is lower than) the market return over the 
forecast horizon. Finally, Panel C presents the threshold distribution for total benchmarkers. Here, 
the most prevalent thresholds for buy recommendations are ten percent and 15 percent, and for sell 
recommendations are zero percent, ten percent, and 15 percent.7 Notice that brokers may use 
different thresholds for buy and sell recommendations, especially for total benchmarkers.  
It is important to clarify that the benchmarks and their associated target thresholds are 
related to but different from the target prices issued by analysts. To see the relation between the 
two, note that given a 12-month ahead target price and a current stock price, one can derive the 
analyst’s expected return implied by the target price (ERTP) as  
      ERTP=(TP0 – P-1)/ P-1, 
where TP0 is the target price, and P-1 is the stock price one day before the target price is issued.8 
Thus, the target price gives rise to an implied expected return, while the target threshold associated 
                                                             
6 The literal meaning of the recommendation also includes the forecast horizon: how long should it take for the 
recommendation prediction to materialize. In our data, the vast majority of brokers consider a 12-month horizon.  
7 Some brokers also change the target thresholds, which explains the different total number of brokers for “Target 
(Buy)” and “Target (Sell)” in panel C of Table 2.  
8 For simplicity, this definition of expected return inferred from target price focuses on expected price appreciation 
only, ignoring dividend yield. When we use ERTP in our analysis, we also consider versions that do account for the 
dividend yield.  
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with the benchmark specifies a bound on the expected return relative to some benchmark return. 
We further discuss the relation between the benchmarks and the target prices later in this section. 
Benchmark Determinants 
The analysts’ disclosures demonstrate that different brokerage houses rely on different 
benchmarks. One obvious question is why. In fact, it may be surprising that some brokers are not 
industry benchmarkers. Using an industry benchmark fits well with the structure of research 
departments in brokerage houses, where analysts work in industry groups and are deemed industry 
specialists (e.g., Boni and Womack, 2006; Kadan et al., 2012). On the other hand, being an expert 
in one industry is not enough for an analyst working under a market or total benchmark. These 
analysts may also need to have knowledge across other industries— for them to be able to predict 
a stock’s performance relative to the market—or even to have an overall knowledge of the 
market— to be able to predict a stock’s raw return. 
Analysts we have interviewed hinted at a tension about which benchmark should be used. 
Analysts working for an industry benchmarker emphasized the natural fit between being an 
industry specialist and using an industry benchmark. They also pointed out that ranking firms 
within an industry arises directly from application of techniques such as comparables. Others 
expressed preference towards a total benchmark, given that a total return expectation is a direct 
product of applying a discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology. They also argued that an 
expectation about total return is the most useful output from the perspective of investors. Finally, 
some argued that the market benchmark makes sense as well, since it is common practice to 
evaluate each equity asset relative to the market (or a popular index such as the S&P 500).  
To add to this anecdotal evidence and provide some large sample results on the 
determinants of the benchmarks, we explore their possible association with brokers’ 
characteristics. In unreported analysis, we show that two variables emerge as strong determinants 
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of the choice of benchmark. The first is broker size, measured by the number of recommendations 
issued by a broker as a fraction of all recommendations issued during the year. Larger brokers are 
more likely to adopt an industry benchmark as opposed to either market or total benchmarks. It 
may be that large brokers that employ a large number of analysts can allow analysts to focus on a 
select group of firms in one particular industry, leading to more industry specialization and thereby 
to industry benchmarking. The second determinant is the number of industries covered. A larger 
number of covered industries is associated with a lower likelihood of industry benchmarking and 
a higher likelihood of adopting a market benchmark. It may be that brokers that follow many 
industries have a better perspective of the market, and thereby are more capable of benchmarking 
their recommendations to it.  
Do Analysts Abide by the Benchmarks? 
Before turning to our main empirical analysis of benchmarks’ implications, it is interesting 
to ask whether analysts abide by their broker’s stated benchmark. Recommendations from analysts 
employing an industry benchmark are statements about the analysts’ expectations on how stocks 
will perform relative to their industry peers; that is, these analysts rely on ranking firms within the 
industry. By contrast, market and total benchmarkers may determine their recommendations by 
considering their expectations of both the intra-industry ranking of the firms and the industry 
performance relative to the market. We thus expect that industry benchmarkers would primarily 
use within-industry information about firm fundamentals, while market and total benchmarkers 
would also rely on across-industry information.  
To examine this hypothesis we relate stock recommendations to firms’ fundamentals as 
expressed by analysts’ other outputs: earnings and long-term growth forecasts. Our analysis 
(unreported, available upon request) shows that all types of benchmarkers rely similarly on within-
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industry information, but that market and total benchmarkers indeed place more weight on across-
industry information than industry benchmarkers when forming their recommendations.  
We also examine the implication of adoption of different benchmarks on the relation 
between recommendations and target prices. For total benchmarkers, we expect a close alignment 
between recommendations and target prices, because both rely on forecasts of raw returns. For 
example, if a buy is issued and the literal meaning of the buy is that the stock should yield at least 
10%, then one should see the ERTP of the contemporaneous target price to be at least 10%. 
However, less consistency is expected from industry and market benchmarkers. 
 In unreported analysis we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis: The fraction of 
optimistic recommendations that appear with strictly positive (negative) ERTPs is significantly 
higher, and the average ERTP is more positive (negative) for optimistic (pessimistic) 
recommendations of total benchmarkers, compared to industry and market benchmarkers.  
Overall, these results are consistent with analysts indeed abiding by their benchmarks, 
suggesting that the benchmarks matter in the way recommendations are created.9 In the next 
section we present our main results, studying whether and how benchmarks should be accounted 
for when interpreting analysts’ outputs.  
III. RESULTS 
In this section, we explore how several aspects of analyst recommendations are affected by 
the adoption of different benchmarks. We study how the distribution of analysts’ recommendations 
relates to the benchmarks. We then examine how investors react to recommendations based on 
different benchmarks. Next, we study how the benchmarks are associated with analysts’ ability to 
                                                             
9 One possibility is that analysts are following the benchmarks determined by their brokerage house. An alternative is 
that brokerage houses simply adopted benchmarks reflecting the common practice of their own analysts.  
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deliver long-term returns through their recommendations. We finish by investigating how the 
different benchmarks affect the value of analysts’ stock picking advice. 
Analysts’ Benchmarks and the Distribution of Recommendations  
We examine whether the choice of the benchmark is associated with the characteristics of 
the recommendations issued by a broker. The literature has largely ignored the fact that analysts 
use a variety of benchmarks and has treated recommendations as homogeneous. Figure 1 plots the 
distribution of recommendations broken down by benchmark type. In the classification of the 
recommendation levels, we denote strong buys and buys as buy recommendations and sells and 
strong sells as sell recommendations. The figure demonstrates an important and salient feature that 
distinguishes the recommendation distribution of industry benchmarkers from that of market and 
total benchmarkers: Recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers tend to be less bullish 
than those issued by market or total benchmarkers. It appears that the distribution of 
recommendations is strongly related to benchmark choice.  
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
Table 3 explores the relation between benchmark choice and the distribution of 
recommendations in a multivariate setting. We use firm fixed-effects logistic regressions in which 
the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one when the recommendation is a buy or a strong 
buy in model (1) and sell or strong sell in model (2). Our main explanatory variables are indicators 
equal to one if the broker is an industry (market) benchmarker and zero otherwise.   
 < Insert Table 3 here > 
The inclusion of firm fixed-effects frees us from having to control for firm characteristics 
that are not varying over time. Instead, we focus on broker characteristics and time-varying aspects 
that have been shown to affect the optimism of analysts.   There is long literature relating conflicts 
of interest stemming from the relationship between investment banking and sell-side research to 
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the optimism in analyst recommendations (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 
1999). We use a broker affiliation dummy to proxy for such conflicts of interest.  The affiliation 
dummy variable is equal to one if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter 
or a co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the recommendation 
announcement date.  We also control for past market and firm performance, based on the evidence 
that analysts chase momentum (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee 2004), and for broker and 
analyst characteristics. We further include indicators for whether the recommendation is issued by 
an analyst who is employed by a brokerage house that was sanctioned during the Global Settlement 
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman 2006; Kadan et al. 2009), and for whether the 
brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid at the time the recommendation is issued 
(Kadan et al. 2009). Finally, we control for analyst experience, measured as the number of days 
the analyst has appeared in IBES. 
The results confirm the univariate inferences in Figure 1, showing that the adopted 
benchmark is strongly associated with the bullishness of recommendations. Columns (1) and (2) 
show that industry benchmarkers are less likely to issue buy and strong buy recommendations and 
more likely to issue sell and strong sell recommendations as compared to market and total 
benchmarkers. Columns (3) and (4) show in addition that market benchmarkers are less likely to 
issue bullish recommendations compared to total benchmarkers. Columns (5) to (8) repeat the 
analysis controlling for threshold levels presented in Table 2. The results are similar.10,11 
                                                             
10 A possible explanation for the difference in the distribution of recommendation is that the coverage universe varies 
across the different benchmarkers. To explore this possibility, in an unreported analysis we restrict attention only to 
firms that are covered by all three types of benchmarkers. The results are not materially affected, reinforcing the link 
between benchmark choice and the distribution of recommendations. 
11 One way to reinforce the association between the benchmarks and the distribution of recommendations, is to look 
at instances in which a broker changes its benchmarks. Our data contain five such changes, from either total or market 
to industry benchmarks. In three of them, no significant shift in the distribution of recommendations follows the 
change in benchmark. In the other two, though, there is a significant increase in the fraction of sell recommendations 
around the event: a jump from 5% to 12% following a change from market to industry benchmarks, and from 3% to 
17% following a change from total to industry benchmarks. 
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We emphasize that while the distribution of recommendations issued by industry 
benchmarkers is clearly tilted toward less bullish recommendations compared to that of market 
and total benchmarkers, one cannot simply conclude that industry benchmarkers are fundamentally 
less optimistic than market or total benchmarkers. The reason is that the different benchmarks 
imply different meanings (or adjustments) of the recommendations. This is akin to raw, market-
adjusted, or industry-adjusted returns, which cannot be directly compared. Instead, the conclusion 
of this analysis should be that when studying the optimism of analysts through their 
recommendations, one should control for (or take into account) the benchmark type.12 
Analysts’ Benchmarks and Price Reactions to Recommendations 
Next we evaluate the extent to which investors take into account the benchmarks when 
responding to stock recommendations. The complexity of generating recommendations’ signals 
varies with the benchmark. Total benchmarkers are facing the most challenging task, since 
predicting whether a given stock will exceed a return threshold requires them to provide insights 
on the expected performance of a stock, its industry, and the market as a whole. Market 
benchmarkers have a less demanding task, since predicting whether a given stock will outperform 
the market requires ranking firms within their industries and ranking industries, but no specific 
outlook is required for the market as a whole. Finally, industry benchmarkers are facing the least 
challenging task of just ranking firms within their industries.  
To this end, we study the price reactions around the issuance of analyst recommendations. 
We distinguish between three types of price reactions: industry-adjusted, market-adjusted, and 
unadjusted. A buy recommendation from an industry benchmarker implies the recommended stock 
is expected to outperform its industry peers. Therefore, the recommendation is a statement about 
the firm’s expected industry-adjusted returns. If this view is shared by investors, an optimistic 
                                                             
12 We thank a referee for pointing out this issue to us. 
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(pessimistic) recommendation should result in a positive (negative) industry-adjusted return. 
Similarly, if investors believe a recommendation from a market benchmarker reflects analysts’ 
expectations of a stock’s future performance relative to the market, then the price response to an 
optimistic (pessimistic) recommendation should be positive (negative) after adjusting for the 
market return.  Finally, unadjusted (or raw returns) should be the natural price reaction to 
recommendations from total benchmarkers. 
We should also see differential price reactions when recommendations are pooled across 
different types of benchmarkers. A buy recommendation from an industry benchmarker is a more 
clear statement regarding expected industry-adjusted returns than a buy from a market or total 
benchmarker. For a market benchmarker, for example, a buy suggests the recommended stock is 
expected to beat the market, but this outcome may be due to the performance of the industry rather 
than of the firm, so this buy does not necessarily imply positive industry-adjusted returns for a 
particular stock. Thus, industry-adjusted price reactions should be stronger for recommendations 
from industry benchmarkers compared to recommendations from other benchmarkers. Similarly, 
market-adjusted price reactions should be more aligned with recommendations from market 
benchmarkers and unadjusted price reactions to recommendations from total benchmarkers. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents results from regressing the three types of price reactions to 
recommendation upgrades on indicators for the types of benchmarks and several control 
variables.13 We focus on recommendation revisions instead of levels because prior research finds 
that revisions are more informative (Boni and Womack 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim 2010). The stark 
result from this analysis is that industry-adjusted price reactions are significantly more positive 
following upgrades of recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers compared to 
                                                             
13 To avoid the confounding effects of price reactions to earnings, we remove recommendations issued within a three-
day window of earnings announcements. We also remove days on which the IBES universe records multiple analysts 
issuing recommendations for the firm.  
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recommendations issued by market and total benchmarkers. This result is consistent with industry 
benchmarkers providing more useful insights in terms of ranking firms within their industries, and 
with investors understanding this. By contrast, we do not find evidence that recommendations 
issued by market benchmarkers garner significantly higher market-adjusted price reactions. 
Furthermore, unadjusted price reactions to total benchmarkers’ upgrades are smaller than reactions 
to upgrades from other benchmarkers. This is consistent with the complexity hypothesis, 
suggesting that investors do not find recommendations issued by total benchmarkers more valuable 
in predicting unadjusted returns. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
Due to the close relation between target prices and benchmarks, it is possible that the 
information in target prices subsumes much of the information in the recommendation benchmarks 
and their associated targets. To further evaluate the role of the benchmarks in generating price 
reactions, in columns (5)-(8) we control for the expected returns implied by target prices as defined 
earlier.14 The sample size here is substantially reduced since we restrict attention to 
recommendations that are accompanied by target prices only. Note first that the expected return 
from target prices is a strong determinant of price reactions to recommendation upgrades. 
Intuitively, investors respond more positively to stock recommendations that are associated with 
higher expected returns.  Regarding the benchmarks, the results in columns (5)-(8) are qualitatively 
similar to those in columns (1)-(4). In particular, industry-adjusted price reactions to upgrades 
issued by industry benchmarkers are significantly positive, consistent with industry benchmarkers 
being able to provide useful insights in terms of ranking firms within their industries.  
                                                             
14 We repeat the analysis with an alternative definition of expected returns after taking into account the expected 
dividend yield. We also repeat the analysis controlling for changes in expected returns (rather than levels) and for 
earnings-forecasts revisions. The results are similar. 
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In Panel B we study price reactions to downgrades and we find parallel results. The only 
difference is that once we control for the expected return from target prices, the coefficient on the 
industry benchmark becomes insignificant. This, however, may well be attributed to the smaller 
sample.15  To explore whether the price reaction results are driven by differences in coverage across 
different benchmarks, in Panel C we repeat the analysis restricting attention to firms that are 
covered by all three benchmark types. The conclusions are similar with the exception of somewhat 
weaker results for downgrades. Finally, in Panel D we control for the target thresholds documented 
in Table 2. The conclusions are not affected materially.  
Analysts’ Benchmarks and the Investment Value in Recommendations 
Different benchmarks imply different objectives for recommendations. For industry 
benchmarkers the objective is to beat the industry peers; for market benchmarkers it means beating 
the market; and for total benchmarkers it means beating an absolute return threshold. In this 
section, we analyze the performance of analysts based on whether the recommended stocks behave 
“as promised” in the analysts’ disclosures, meeting or beating their declared objective.  
< Insert Table 5 here > 
To evaluate whether the recommendation’s objective has been achieved we follow two 
approaches. First, we compare the cumulative stock return associated with the recommendation to 
its stated objective as indicated by the benchmark plus the target threshold (Table 2) over a period 
of 12 months or until the recommendation is revoked (if earlier than 12 months).16 Under this 
approach, we follow the literal meaning of the recommendation’s stated objective, without 
                                                             
15 In unreported results we estimate the model for downgrades on the subsample with target prices but without 
controlling for target price expected returns. We find similar results to those reported in columns (5)-(8) of Panel B of 
Table 4, suggesting that the reduction in significance in columns (5)-(8) may be attributed to the smaller sample rather 
than the additional controls.  
16 In other words, a recommendation is evaluated throughout its stated life span as long as its advice is still outstanding. 
This definition of the life span of a recommendation is similar to the approach used in the literature when examining 
the investment value of recommendations. See, for example, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) and 
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). 
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accounting for risk. This is consistent with how the analysts’ employers and institutional investors 
most often judge recommendations’ performance.17  
In the second approach, we also consider the risk profile of stock recommendations. We 
want to isolate any performance that is associated with loadings on risk factors, and only measure 
performance that is due to insights offered by the analysts. For this purpose we match each 
recommendation (a firm i that receives a buy or sell at time t) to a control unit (another firm ic and 
another time period tc) such that firm i at time t and firm ic at time tc have a similar risk profile 
based on the four Fama-French factors: beta, size, book-to-market and momentum. The matching 
procedure is based on the nearest neighbor matching of propensity scores (Rosembaum and Rubin 
1983). This procedure solves the problem of the “curse of dimensionality” that appears when 
matches over multiple dimensions are required, and has been used in many different corporate 
finance settings (e.g., Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinavasan 2011; Drucker and Puri 2005; 
Villalonga 2004; Colak and Whited 2007; Hellman, Lindsey and Puri 2008).  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the fraction of buy/sell recommendations that meet their stated 
objectives. We report this success rate broken down by the three different benchmarks, and 
separately for the actual recommendations and for their control units. The results indicate that 
about 51 percent of buy recommendations issued by industry and market benchmarkers meet or 
beat their objective. By contrast, 43.8 percent of buy recommendations issued by total 
benchmarkers do so. The results for sell recommendations paint a similar picture. These results 
seem plausible, as meeting the objective for total benchmarkers is arguably a harder task. Indeed, 
total benchmarkers need to base their advice on predictions related to firm-specific returns, 
industry returns, and market returns. Note also that common targets used by total benchmarkers 
                                                             
17 Conversations with sell-side analysts indicated that the benchmarks are in fact used internally by the brokers when 
assessing the performance of their analysts. A press article related to the benchmarkers reinforces the view that 
analysts do want their recommendations to be interpreted relative to the adopted benchmarks. See “Credit Suisse: 
These Downgrades Aren’t Personal,” The Wall Street Journal, October 2nd, 2012. 
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are ten percent and 15 percent (see Table 2). These quite high thresholds could also contribute to 
total benchmarkers’ lower success rate in hitting their targets.18 
Next, we consider whether the success rate for buy recommendations is driven by their risk 
characteristics. To do that, we compare the success rates between the actual recommendations and 
the control units. For all types of benchmarks, firms for which analysts issue buy recommendations 
perform better than firms with similar risk characteristics that did not receive such 
recommendations.19 For example, 51.0 percent of buy recommendations issued by industry 
benchmarkers hit their targets, compared with 45.6 percent of control units. Additionally, while 
recommendations issued by total benchmarkers are less likely to beat the target when compared to 
those issued by market or industry benchmarkers, they perform better than their control units (43.8 
percent vs. 38.4 percent). The difference in success rates between actual recommendations and 
their control units for sell recommendations is even larger than for buy recommendations.  
Panel B of Table 5 considers the magnitudes by which analysts beat (or miss) their stated 
objectives. The table reports the average, as well as the median, difference between the realized 
return and the stated objective for each recommendation in our sample as well as for the control 
units. The results are consistent with those in Panel A. Indeed, industry and market benchmarkers 
significantly beat their stated objective for both buy and sell recommendations. For example, a buy 
recommendation from an industry benchmarker on average yields a return that exceeds the stated 
objective by 456 basis points. By contrast, total benchmarkers on average miss their stated 
objective. For example, a sell recommendation issued by a total benchmarker misses the target by 
925 basis points. To evaluate the performance of recommendations relative to the performance of 
                                                             
18 The ability of total benchmarkers to meet their stated objectives is closely tied to the performance of the market. In 
an unreported analysis we examine the performance of total benchmarkers separately based on ex-post annual market 
returns. Indeed, we find that total benchmarkers meet their buy (sell) targets more (less) frequently during periods of 
superior (inferior) market returns.  
19 For the control unit, we measure performance over a period with the same length and using the same stated objective 
as for its corresponding actual recommendation.  
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stocks with similar risk characteristics and stated objective, we consider the control units. We find 
that for all types of benchmarkers, the mean and median excess returns over the stated objectives 
for buy (sell) recommendations are better (worse) than those of the control units.      
In sum, Table 5 reveals that for all types of benchmarks buy (sell) recommendations 
outperform (underperform) stocks with similar risk profiles and subject to the same investment 
objective. Analysts using industry or market benchmarks are more likely to achieve the stated 
recommendation objectives than analysts using total benchmarks. The lower success rate of total 
benchmarkers is likely a result of a more stringent stated objective. 
Analysts’ Benchmarks and Stock Picking  
Institutional investors consistently rank industry knowledge as the most important research 
attribute of sell-side analysts (Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2017), and analysts agree with this 
assessment (Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp, 2015). Accordingly, analysts’ ability to identify the 
best (winners) and worst (losers) prospects within an industry—to which we refer as stock 
picking—should be a valuable skill to investors. In this section, we analyze the implications of 
adopting different benchmarks on the usefulness of recommendations as signals for winners and 
losers within industries.  
Boni and Womack (2006) show that analysts create value to investors primarily through 
their ability to rank stocks within industries. Boni and Womack’s analysis, however, does not 
account for the benchmarks. The adoption of a specific benchmark may have two inter-related 
effects on the value analysts deliver through their stock picking. First, the benchmark can either 
help or hinder the stock-picking ability of the analysts, and second, the benchmark can affect the 
ability of analysts to convey their opinion through their recommendations.  
To see the first issue, note that an industry benchmarkers’ main focus is on ranking stocks 
within an industry, while both market and total benchmarks attend to additional tasks. Consistent 
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with the complexity hypothesis discussed earlier, one may expect the stock-picking skills of the 
latter would be reduced. Second, even if all benchmarkers possess stock-picking skills, different 
benchmarks can help or hinder an analyst’s ability to effectively communicate her opinion. Indeed, 
buys and sells issued by industry benchmarkers are expected to be direct signals of winners and 
losers within an industry. In contrast, since market (total) benchmarkers add industry (industry and 
market) information to the formation of their recommendations, these recommendations may not 
be as clear an indicator of within-industry winners and losers. For example, a good stock in a very 
poor industry may be a buy for an industry benchmarker, but a hold or even a sell for a market 
benchmarker. Good prospects for a stock might also be offset by poor market prospects: a total 
benchmarker may issue fewer buys if she forecasts low future market performance, so that some 
within-industry winners may not receive a buy signal from that broker. 
The discussion thus far suggests that recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers 
possess superior value to investors in terms of both their stock-picking performance, and in terms 
of their ability to convey this information. We test this prediction by applying the trading strategy 
devised in Boni and Womack (2006). The strategy forms within-industry portfolios which are long 
in upgraded stocks and short in downgraded stocks in a way that the performance of the resulting 
portfolios is both industry- and market-neutral. The null hypothesis is that the performance of such 
portfolios is identical regardless of the type of benchmark adopted by the brokers issuing the 
recommendations. The alternative hypothesis is that such portfolios based on recommendations 
issued by industry benchmarkers outperform those of market and total benchmarkers, reflecting 
the former’s superior stock picking and/or better ability to convey information.   
To illustrate the methodology, consider a portfolio based on recommendations from 
industry benchmarkers. For each month and each stock, we count the number of recommendation 
upgrades minus the number of recommendation downgrades from industry benchmarkers. If this 
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measure is positive (negative), the stock is considered net upgraded (net downgraded). The strategy 
takes long (short) positions in net upgraded (net downgraded) stocks and keeps them open over 
the following month. In each month, we only consider stocks from industries that have at least one 
net upgraded and one net downgraded stock. We derive portfolio returns by first computing the 
weighted-average returns for the long-short positions within each industry, then equal-weighting 
the results across the industries. This yields a time series of monthly portfolio returns. We repeat 
the process to create portfolios based on recommendations from other types of benchmarkers.    
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Panel A of Table 6 shows mean returns, Sharpe ratios, and the Fama-French 4-factor alphas 
for different portfolios depending on the type of benchmark adopted by brokers.  By every 
measure, the portfolio based on recommendations from industry benchmarkers presents the best 
performance, with a higher average monthly return and a higher Sharpe ratio. More importantly, 
while the portfolio based on recommendations from market and total benchmarkers yields an 
insignificant monthly risk-adjusted return (alpha) of 0.124 percent, the portfolio based on 
recommendations from industry benchmarkers yields a significantly positive monthly risk-
adjusted return of 0.40 percent. These alphas are significantly different, as suggested by the alpha 
of a difference portfolio (last row of the table) that goes long on the portfolio based on market and 
total benchmarkers and short on the portfolio based on industry benchmarkers.  
The attempt to add industry and market signals to the recommendation advice may blur the 
stock-picking signals from market and total benchmarkers. If there are subsets of firms for which 
stock picking signals are stronger, these signals may be sufficient to overcome the noise brought 
by the inclusion of industry and market signals. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) 
propose and confirm that the value of investment strategies depend on characteristics of the firm 
receiving the recommendation advice—in their case, firm size. This follows Womack’s (1996) 
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evidence that post-recommendation price drift is higher for smaller firms. Barber et al. (2001) 
reason that the value of analysts’ advice could be heightened for smaller firms, for which there is 
less information publicly available, and whose price discrepancies are more difficult to be 
arbitraged away by investors. In a similar vein, firms with low analyst coverage are the ones for 
which the opportunity to unlock value is the highest.  
To this end, we reexamine the manifestation of stock picking-skills on subsets of firms in 
which these skills are expected to be stronger. For these firms, even market and total benchmarkers 
may show stock picking skills. We repeat the Boni and Womack (2006) algorithm for small vs. 
large firms, and low- vs. high-coverage firms. We define small (large) firms as the ones whose 
market value of equity, measured in the month before the recommendation announcement date, is 
below (above) the median value of that measure. Similarly, low-coverage (high-coverage) firms 
are those for which the number of analysts in the previous year is below (above) the median. 
Results appear in Panels B and C of Table 6. A few patterns stand out. First, as in Barber 
et al. (2001), the value of investment strategies are confined to the samples in which analysts’ 
abilities are more ripe for manifestation: Fama-French 4-factor alphas for portfolios from industry 
benchmarkers are highly significant for the subsamples of small or low-coverage stocks, but no 
longer significant for the subsamples of large or high-coverage stocks. Besides, for small or low-
coverage stocks, even portfolios aggregating all types of brokers demonstrate stock picking skills. 
On the other hand, portfolios based solely on recommendations from market and total 
benchmarkers never show evidence of stock picking skills, even for the subsamples of small and 
low-coverage stocks.20 Evidence of stock picking skills from market and total benchmarkers is 
missing, even for subsamples where such skills could be manifested at their best. 
                                                             
20 The result that alphas from portfolios based on all types of benchmarkers, but not from portfolios based on market 
and total benchmarkers alone, are significantly positive may come from an improvement of alphas from industry 
benchmarkers. The alpha from portfolio of industry benchmarkers in the subsample of low-coverage stocks, of 0.723, 
is significantly bigger than the corresponding alpha of 0.400 for the overall sample of recommendations.  
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Overall, the results suggest that recommendations from industry benchmarkers are indeed 
better indicators of within-industry winners and losers: Investors can gain more valuable within-
industry information from industry benchmarkers, and more so for small and low-coverage firms. 
IV. IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
In this paper, we examine the literal meaning of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. 
We document that different brokers rely on different benchmarks with respect to which the 
investment advice in each recommendation should be interpreted. Our empirical analyses 
demonstrate that benchmarks have implications on how analysts’ outputs should be interpreted 
and used by investors.  
Our results suggest that future research should consider analysts’ benchmarks when 
studying analysts’ behavior and outputs. A large stream of papers has focused on analysts’ 
optimism and how it relates to conflicts of interests and other analysts’ characteristics. We find 
that the benchmarks are an important determinant of the distribution of analysts’ 
recommendations. Industry benchmarkers are less likely to issue bullish recommendations 
compared to market and total benchmarkers. We caution that such differences cannot be 
interpreted simply as systematic differences in optimism among analysts given the different 
meanings of recommendations. Instead, when studying analysts’ optimism, one needs to control 
for benchmarks, essentially comparing optimism only within analysts using the same benchmark.  
More generally, when considering variations in analysts’ recommendations, researchers 
need to account for the fact that, in forming recommendations, analysts deal with within-industry 
and across-industry information differently, depending on their adopted benchmark. Thus, 
differences in opinions (disagreement) between analysts could be attributed to the benchmarks 
they use, a factor that might be used as a control variable in some settings.  
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When studying target prices, the literature has often focused on the implied expected return. 
This implied expected return is most consistent with stock recommendations from total 
benchmarkers, which is natural given the objectives defined by their benchmarks. Therefore, future 
research might account for the type of benchmark when studying certain aspects of target prices.  
Our analysis also highlights new aspects of Clement’s (1999) complexity hypothesis. We 
show that industry-adjusted price reactions to recommendation changes issued by industry 
benchmarkers are larger, reflecting the credence investors attribute to their outputs. By contrast, 
price reactions to upgrades issued by total benchmarkers, whose task is the most complex, are 
smaller, reflecting the lower confidence with which the market views their output. Future research 
studying market response to analysts’ outputs may well account for the benchmarks.  
There has been a lot of interest in the literature in whether analysts’ recommendations 
provide investment value. Our paper sheds new light on this issue and offers a new method to 
evaluate investment value, accounting for risk, while simultaneously considering the different 
analysts’ benchmarks. We also find that analysts’ stock picking skills and their ability to 
communicate their views depend on the benchmarks. Thus, future studies investigating the value 
in analyst recommendations should take the different benchmarks into account. 
In summary, our study suggests that both academics and investors should pay more 
attention to the declared objective of analysts’ stock recommendations. In particular, the fact that 
different recommendations carry different meanings can be used to shed new light on a range of 
empirical questions. Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008), for example, advocate the need for a better 
understanding of how analysts operate. The different benchmarks employed by brokers suggest 
that information shocks would affect recommendations differently depending on the broker’s 
benchmark, e.g., with industry shocks affecting more the recommendations from market and total 
benchmarkers.  Other potential areas worth of a second look are the roles of incentives and bias in 
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determining recommendations (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999) and 
ranking analysts based on their stock-picking ability (e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2004). 
These come naturally once one recognizes that performance is a comparison between the return of 
the recommended stock and the stated objective. These are left as avenues for future research. 
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TABLE 1 
 Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics on the different types of benchmarks and their description. Only brokerage houses which issued at least 200 recommendations 
to U.S. firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2014) are included in the analysis. For each type of benchmark, we describe the meaning of the benchmark, 
report the number of brokers using it, the mean and median of the number of recommendations issued by each broker, the total number of recommendations issued 
by all brokers, the percentage out of the total number of recommendations, and the number of top-20 brokers (based on the number of issued recommendations) 
using it.  
      # of Recommendations Per Broker   
Benchmark Description 
No. of 
Brokers Mean  Median Total % of all  
Top 20 
Brokers 
Industry 
Recommendation is benchmarked against performance of 
peers in the same sector 38 2257  904  85756 24.14% 7 
Total Recommendation is based on a stock's total return. 52 1352  779  70285 19.78% 3 
Market 
Recommendation is benchmarked against market 
performance 29 1815  928  52633 14.81% 2 
Changes 
A broker changes the benchmark during our sample period 
and we cannot identify when the broker made the change. 7 3723  2612  26061 7.33% 2 
Sector/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-adjusted return 
relative to industry performance. 7 3425  1343  23977 6.75% 2 
Total/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-adjusted return 
relative to sector performance. 12 1897  1814  22768 6.41% 1 
No data Cannot find data on the definition of ratings. 39 566  285  22065 6.21% 0 
Not sure Cannot identify which benchmark a broker uses. 11 1139  766  12531 3.53% 1 
Market/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total return and/or 
benchmarked against market performance. 7 1781  451  12468 3.51% 1 
Industry/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total return and/or 
benchmarked against industry performance. 5 2363  2215  11815 3.33% 1 
Market/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-adjusted return 
relative to the market performance. 4 2506  2394  10025 2.82% 0  
Market/Industry 
Recommendation is benchmarked against market and/or 
industry performance. 4 830  693  3318 0.93% 0  
Market/Industry/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total return and/or 
benchmarked against market and/or industry performance. 2 808  808  1615 0.45% 0  
                
All   217     355317     
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TABLE 2  
Distribution of Target Thresholds 
This table summarizes the distribution of buy and sell targets thresholds for industry, market and total benchmarkers 
in our sample. For an industry benchmarker, a buy (sell) recommendation target is defined as the ‘x’ percent return a 
stock is expected to outperform (underperform) the industry. For a market benchmarker, a buy (sell) recommendation 
target is defined as the ‘x’ percent return a stock is expected to outperform (underperform) the market. For a total 
benchmarker, a buy (sell) recommendation target is defined as the ‘x’ (negative ‘x’) percent total return a stock is 
expected to outperform (underperform). 
 
Panel A: Industry Benchmarkers 
Buy Recommendations   Sell Recommendations 
Target # Brokers # Recs % Recs   Target  # Brokers 
# 
Recs % Recs 
0 33 29296 86.8%  0 33 9183 90.9% 
10% 2 1667 4.9%  10% 2 294 2.9% 
11% 1 149 0.4%  11% 1 20 0.2% 
20% 1 175 0.5%  20% 1 38 0.4% 
N.A. 1 2455 7.3%   N.A. 1 566 5.6% 
             
All 38 33742 100%   All 38 10101 100% 
         
Panel B: Market Benchmarkers 
  Buy Recommendations     Sell Recommendations 
Target # Brokers # Recs % Recs   Target  # Brokers 
# 
Recs % Recs 
0 17 14186 61.2%  0 19 2142 54.4% 
5% 5 2466 10.6%  5% 4 394 10.0% 
6% 1 4433 19.1%  6% 1 1097 27.8% 
10% 1 107 0.5%  15% 3 215 5.5% 
15% 3 1201 5.2%  20% 1 20 0.5% 
20% 1 124 0.5%  
 
   
N.A. 2 647 2.8%   N.A. 2 72 1.8% 
                
All 30 23164 100%   All 30 3940 1.0 
         
Panel C: Total Benchmarkers 
Buy Recommendations  Sell Recommendations 
Target # Brokers # Recs % Recs   Target # Brokers 
# 
Recs % Recs 
0 3 1193 3.3%  0 17 1031 22.2% 
5% 1 231 0.6%  5% 1 24 0.5% 
6% 1 83 0.2%  6% 1 4 0.1% 
7% 1 260 0.7%  10% 16 1854 39.8% 
10% 19 11642 32.5%  13% 1 3 0.1% 
13% 1 208 0.6%  15% 14 836 18.0% 
15% 24 12244 34.2%  20% 3 202 4.3% 
20% 5 2994 8.4%      
25% 1 3412 9.5%      
30% 1 97 0.3%      
N.A. 3 3448 9.6%   N.A. 6 699 15.0% 
             
All 60 35812 100%   All 59 4653 100% 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Optimism/Pessimism in Recommendations 
The table presents results of logistic regressions whose dependent variable equals 1 when a recommendation is either optimistic or pessimistic. Our sample period 
is between 9/2002 and 12/2014. All models use firm fixed effects. Optimistic recommendations are strong buy and buy, and pessimistic recommendations are sell 
and strong sell. Industry (Market) takes value of 1 if a broker uses an industry benchmark and 0 if a broker uses other benchmarks.  Aff is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the 
recommendation announcement date. Sanct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who is employed by a sanctioned 
brokerage house. Pastfirmperf is the stock return over [-180, -2]. Pastmkperf is the market return over [-180, -2]. Experience is defined as the number of days 
the analyst has appeared in IBES. Tier3 is an indicator variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid at the time a recommendation 
is issued. Target_buy (Target_sell) is the buy (sell) targets thresholds for each broker. For detailed definition on targets thresholds, please see table 2. Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) 
         
Industry -0.227*** 0.410*** -0.300*** 0.425*** -0.144*** 0.410*** -0.276*** 0.407*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0215) (0.0116) (0.0260) (0.0124) (0.0255) (0.0192) (0.0356) 
Market   -0.160*** 0.0329   -0.155*** -0.00406 
   (0.0117) (0.0288)   (0.0179) (0.0343) 
Target_buy     0.868***  0.182*  
     (0.0732)  (0.104)  
Target_sell      0.874***  0.861*** 
      (0.229)  (0.257) 
AFF 0.252*** -0.618*** 0.257*** -0.619*** 0.264*** -0.637*** 0.266*** -0.637*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0456) (0.0199) (0.0456) (0.0209) (0.0474) (0.0209) (0.0474) 
PASTMKTPERF 0.292*** -0.347*** 0.284*** -0.345*** 0.249*** -0.280*** 0.243*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0974) (0.0559) (0.0973) (0.0573) (0.100) (0.0573) (0.100) 
PASTFIRMPERF 0.157*** -0.237*** 0.158*** -0.237*** 0.157*** -0.239*** 0.159*** -0.239*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0400) (0.0191) (0.0400) (0.0197) (0.0400) (0.0197) (0.0400) 
SANCT -0.228*** 0.366*** -0.214*** 0.363*** -0.231*** 0.385*** -0.223*** 0.385*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0242) (0.0125) (0.0243) (0.0136) (0.0257) (0.0137) (0.0260) 
EXPERIENCE -0.0220*** 0.0255*** -0.0220*** 0.0255*** -0.0205*** 0.0184*** -0.0215*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00602) (0.00298) (0.00602) (0.00308) (0.00619) (0.00308) (0.00619) 
TIER3 -0.257*** -0.180*** -0.243*** -0.182*** -0.276*** -0.128*** -0.257*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0264) (0.0123) (0.0263) (0.0135) (0.0297) (0.0137) (0.0300) 
         
Observations 176,934 148,307 176,934 148,307 163,486 131,443 163,486 131,443 
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.016 
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TABLE 4  
Price Reactions to Recommendations 
This table reports OLS regression results for the market reaction to analysts’ recommendation upgrades/downgrades for the full sample. The dependent variable is 
the cumulative 3-day return (market adjusted or industry adjusted or raw) around the announcement of upgrades/downgrades by analysts. Our sample period is 
between 9/2002 and 12/2014. Industry (Market or Total) takes value of 1 if a broker uses an industry (Market or Total) benchmark and 0 if a broker uses other 
benchmarks. Pastfirmperf is the stock return over [-180, -2]. Pastmkperf is the market return over [-180, -2]. Experience is defined as the number of days the 
analyst has appeared in IBES. Firmsize is defined as the log of market value of equity 30 days prior to the recommendation date. BE/ME is defined as the book 
value of equity over market value of equity at the end of previous fiscal year. ERTP is the expected return implied from target price which is measured as (PT0 – 
P-1)/ P-1, where PT0 is the target price and P-1 is the closing stock price the day before the target price issuance. Target_buy (Target_sell) is the buy (sell) targets 
thresholds for each broker. For detailed definition on targets thresholds, please see table 2. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Upgrades 
  Without Target Price With Target Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw 
Industry 0.0039***     0.0024***    
 (0.0005)     (0.0005)    
Market   0.0002  -0.0025***   -0.0001  -0.0022*** 
   (0.0005)  (0.0007)   (0.0007)  (0.0008) 
Total    -0.0033*** -0.0043***    -0.0017*** -0.0025*** 
    (0.0005) (0.0006)    (0.0006) (0.0007) 
ERTP       0.0138*** 0.0141*** 0.0139*** 0.0139*** 
       (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Pastfirmperf -0.0022** -0.0025** -0.0020* -0.0020* 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Pastmkperf 0.0101*** 0.0107*** 0.0078** 0.0076** 0.0133*** 0.0106*** 0.0089** 0.0086** 
 (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Experience 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Firmsize -0.0056*** -0.0053*** -0.0054*** -0.0054*** -0.0059*** -0.0055*** -0.0056*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Log(1+BM) 0.0043*** 0.0052*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0056*** 0.0063*** 0.0073*** 0.0073*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Constant 0.0901*** 0.0863*** 0.0906*** 0.0917*** 0.0907*** 0.0872*** 0.0897*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
            
Observations 56,349 56,349 56,349 56,349 37,931 37,931 37,931 37,931 
R-squared 0.0346 0.0276 0.0242 0.0244 0.0558 0.0472 0.0403 0.0405 
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
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Panel B: Downgrades 
  Without Target Price With Target Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw 
                  
Industry -0.0019***     -0.0005    
 (0.0007)     (0.0011)    
Market   -0.0011  0.0005   -0.0014  -0.0005 
   (0.0008)  (0.0009)   (0.0013)  (0.0015) 
Total    0.0025*** 0.0027***    0.0014 0.0013 
    (0.0008) (0.0009)    (0.0013) (0.0014) 
ERTP       0.0159*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 
       (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Pastfirmperf 0.0116*** 0.0123*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0119*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Pastmkperf 0.0188*** 0.0197*** 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0230*** 0.0253*** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
Experience -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Firmsize 0.0060*** 0.0055*** 0.0056*** 0.0056*** 0.0075*** 0.0071*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log(1+BM) 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0118*** 0.0119*** 0.0112*** 0.0123*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Constant -0.1094*** -0.1008*** -0.1028*** -0.1031*** -0.1340*** -0.1277*** -0.1284*** -0.1282*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
            
Observations 37,141 37,141 37,141 37,141 16,270 16,270 16,270 16,270 
R-squared 0.0303 0.0252 0.0239 0.0239 0.0485 0.0419 0.0380 0.0380 
 
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
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Panel C: Subsample of Firms Which are Covered by All Three Benchmarkers in a Year 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw Ind. Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw 
           
Industry 0.0034***     -0.0014    
 (0.0005)     (0.0008)    
Market   0.0004  -0.0021**   -0.0011  0.0003 
   (0.0006)  (0.0008)   (0.0010)  (0.0012) 
Total    -0.0032*** -0.0041***    0.0018* 0.0019* 
    (0.0007) (0.0008)    (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Pastfirmperf -0.0030** -0.0035** -0.0030* -0.0031** 0.0079*** 0.0092*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Pastmkperf 0.0018 0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0142*** 0.0136*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Experience 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Firmsize -0.0053*** -0.0050*** -0.0050*** -0.0050*** 0.0062*** 0.0055*** 0.0056*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log(1+BM) 0.0042*** 0.0057*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0107*** 0.0109*** 0.0128*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Constant 0.0885*** 0.0852*** 0.0877*** 0.0888*** -0.1120*** -0.1008*** -0.1024*** -0.1025*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
            
Observations 30,068 30,068 30,068 30,068 20,534 20,534 20,534 20,534 
R-squared 0.0323 0.0243 0.0205 0.0208 0.0324 0.0248 0.0224 0.0224 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
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Panel D: Controlling for the Targets Thresholds 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Ind Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw Ind Adj Mkt. Adj Raw Raw 
           
Industry 0.0025***     -0.0016*    
 (0.0006)     (0.0009)    
Market   -0.0013**  -0.0023***   -0.0003  0.0010 
   (0.0006)  (0.0007)   (0.0008)  (0.0010) 
Total    -0.0011 -0.0025**    0.0024** 0.0030** 
    (0.0009) (0.0010)    (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Target_buy -0.0229*** -0.0320*** -0.0233*** -0.0203***      
 (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0057) (0.0059)      
Target_sell       -0.0194** -0.0173** -0.0325*** -0.0342*** 
       (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0091) (0.0094) 
Pastfirmperf -0.0020* -0.0023** -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0113*** 0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Pastmkperf 0.0103*** 0.0099*** 0.0077** 0.0076** 0.0175*** 0.0181*** 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Experience 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Firmsize -0.0057*** -0.0054*** -0.0054*** -0.0054*** 0.0064*** 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Log(1+BM) 0.0041*** 0.0052*** 0.0061*** 0.0060*** 0.0118*** 0.0120*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Constant 0.0931*** 0.0907*** 0.0914*** 0.0923*** -0.1163*** -0.1081*** -0.1086*** -0.1091*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
            
Observations 52,048 52,048 52,048 52,048 32,548 32,548 32,548 32,548 
R-squared 0.0348 0.0284 0.0241 0.0243 0.0329 0.0274 0.0255 0.0256 
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TABLE 5 
Performance of Recommendations 
This table analyzes the performance of buy and sell recommendations issued by market/industry/total benchmarkers. Our sample period is between 9/2002 and 
12/2014. Each recommendation is paired with a propensity score matched (control) unit according to the procedure described in Table A1. The table reports 
performance measures for the sample of recommendations and the corresponding sample of control units. In Panel A, the performance variable for each 
recommendation (control unit) is a dummy equal to 1 if the recommendation (control unit) achieved its stated objective. For a buy recommendation, the stated 
objective from an industry (market) [total] benchmarker is Rindustry+target (Rmarket+target)[target], so achieving the objective means R-Rindustry - target>0 (R-Rmarket-
target>0)[R-target>0].  For a sell recommendation, the stated objective from an industry (market) [total] benchmarker is Rindustry - target (Rmarket - target)[target], 
so achieving the objective means R-Rindustry + target<0 (R-Rmarket+target<0)[R-target<0]. For a control unit, the stated objective is the same as in its corresponding 
recommendation. In Panel B, the performance variable is the difference between the cumulative stock return and the stated objective. In Panel C, the performance 
variable is the raw return. Returns associated with a recommendation (the stock return R, the industry return Rindustry and the market return Rmarket) are computed 
during the stated life span of a recommendation—the period in which the recommendation advice is kept alive. This is the period between the recommendation 
issuance and the earliest of (i) 12 months following the recommendation issuance and (ii) the date when the recommendation advice is changed (e.g., though a 
cancelation or an upgrade/downgrade by the same analyst). Returns associated with a control unit are computed for the period starting with the control unit issuance 
date (as defined in Table A1) and with the same number of days as the stated life span of its corresponding recommendation.  P-values for test of difference of 
proportions is reported under the column Diff (p-value). 
 
 
 
 
# obs Buy Control
Diff 
p-value # obs Sell Control
Diff 
p-value
Industry 13,079 51.0% 45.6% 0.0000 4,351 59.8% 49.7% 0.0000
Market 11,876 50.9% 44.7% 0.0000 2,149 54.6% 42.3% 0.0000
Total 19,409 43.8% 38.4% 0.0000 2,627 43.9% 25.3% 0.0000
Panel A: Proportion of Recommendations Achieving the Stated Objective
Buys
% achieving the objective
Sells
% achieving the objective
Buys Sells
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Industry 0.0456 0.0053 0.0119 -0.0210 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0422 -0.0491 0.0449 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000
Market 0.0551 0.0060 0.0044 -0.0272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0277 0.0668 0.0295 0.0000 0.0000
Total -0.0052 -0.0518 -0.0321 -0.0781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0925 0.0480 0.1943 0.1416 0.0000 0.0000
Diff (p-value)Recommendation Control
Panel B: Return in Excess of the Stated Objective
Diff (p-value)Recommendation Control
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TABLE 6 
Industry- and Market Neutral Portfolio Alphas 
This table presents statistics (mean return, Sharpe ratio and Fama-French 4-factor alpha) for returns on industry- and 
market-neutral portfolios formed based on recommendations and the type(s) of benchmarker(s) issuing the 
recommendation. Sampling follows the requirements in Boni and Womack (2006) of only using stocks trading in 
NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex, with share codes of 10, 11, 12, 18, 30 and 31, and priced above $5. The sample period is 
September 2002 through December 2014. Panel A designs portfolios using all available stocks that survive the data 
requirements in Boni and Womack (2006). Panel B repeats the process based on a breakdown of the original sample 
into subsamples of small vs. large stocks. For this, each month we compute the distribution of firm size, proxied by 
market value of equity. We then define small (large) stock as one whose firm size in the month before the 
recommendation announcement date is below (above) the median value of lagged firm size. Panel C uses a breakdown 
of the original sample into subsamples of low- vs. high-coverage stocks. For stock j at month t, we define analyst 
coverage as the number of analysts that have issued at least one recommendations for j in the 12 months preceding t.  
We then compute the monthly distribution of analyst coverage. Finally, we define low-coverage (high-coverage) stock 
as one whose coverage in the month before the recommendation announcement date is below (above) the median 
value of lagged analyst coverage. Each row analyzes returns of a portfolio based on recommendations from one 
specific set of brokers—according to the type of benchmark adopted by these brokers. To construct each portfolio, at 
the end of each month we compute for each stock the number of recommendation upgrades minus the number of 
recommendation downgrades from that set of brokers. If the measure is positive (negative), the stock is considered 
net upgraded (net downgraded). The portfolio consists of taking long (short) positions in net upgraded (net 
downgraded) stocks at the end of the month and keeping the positions open over the following month. Portfolio returns 
are computed first within each industry then equal-weighted across the industries. The portfolio’s monthly excess 
returns are regressed on the four Fama-French factors (excess market return, SMB, HML, and UMD).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coeff t-stat
1. Industry/Market/Total 0.300 0.169 0.148 1.57
2. Market/Total 0.310 0.124 0.120 0.93
3. Industry 0.528 0.296 0.400 3.38
4. Market/Total - Industry (2 minus 3) -0.219 -0.165 -0.400 -2.40
Panel A: All stocks
Benchmarker
Mean 
return
Sharpe
ratio
FF 4-factor alpha
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Table 6. (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coeff t-stat
1. Industry/Market/Total 0.579 0.325 0.428 3.52
2. Market/Total 0.445 0.137 0.278 1.39
3. Industry 0.738 0.282 0.620 3.27
4. Market/Total - Industry (2 minus 3) -0.294 -0.127 -0.460 -1.70
Coeff t-stat
1. Industry/Market/Total 0.186 0.055 0.054 0.49
2. Market/Total 0.277 0.074 0.090 0.50
3. Industry 0.336 0.0883 0.295 1.48
4. Market/Total - Industry (2 minus 3) -0.059 -0.062 -0.329 -1.40
Sample: Large stocks
Benchmarker
Mean 
return
Sharpe
ratio
FF 4-factor alpha
Benchmarker
Mean 
return
Sharpe
ratio
FF 4-factor alpha
Panel B: Breakdown by firm size
Sample: Small stocks
Coeff t-stat
1. Industry/Market/Total 0.508 0.275 0.341 2.85
2. Market/Total 0.316 0.088 0.162 0.85
3. Industry 0.827 0.304 0.723 3.63
4. Market/Total - Industry (2 minus 3) -0.511 -0.185 -0.680 -2.40
Coeff t-stat
1. Industry/Market/Total 0.145 0.024 0.002 0.02
2. Market/Total 0.123 0.004 0.000 -0.02
3. Industry 0.271 0.057 0.243 1.05
4. Market/Total - Industry (2 minus 3) -0.148 -0.076 -0.360 -1.30
Benchmarker
Mean 
return
Sharpe
ratio
FF 4-factor alpha
Panel C: Breakdown by coverage
Sample: High-coverage stocks
Sample: Low-coverage stocks
Benchmarker
Mean 
return
Sharpe
ratio
FF 4-factor alpha
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FIGURE 1 
End-of-Month Distribution of Outstanding Recommendations 
This figure presents, for each month between September 2002 and December 2014, the fractions of buys and strong buys (denoted as buys) and of sells and strong 
sells (denoted as sells) among the outstanding recommendations issued by market, total, and industry benchmarkers. Only brokerage houses which issued at least 
200 recommendations to U.S. firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2014) are included in the analysis.  
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